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Independent, self-funded research. Trade: CEPII BACI; production: OECD ICIO; policy: primary notices.Independent, self-funded research.

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China supplies 88.6 percent of the EU's external magnet imports

Concentrated Chinese input supply and European export exposure create different pressures. AIR 005 maps the trade, legal measures and production-cost channels that matter for sourcing and sales decisions.

AIR 005 · 5 October 2026 · China–Europe Trade Conflict

Read the report · Explore the interactive network

One origin reaches all 27 EU destinations

Exhibit 1. Permanent metal magnets (HS02 850511), 2024; destination area = imports from China

China supplied $1.08 billion of EU external magnet imports; Germany received 47.0% of that China-to-EU flow. Takeaway: dependence spans every EU member.

Note: Centre share uses all EU external magnet imports. Equal-width links show observed flows; positions are schematic. Areas encode values, not production capacity or chemistry.

Source: CEPII BACI HS02 (V202601); Symbiosis United Analytics.

Also in the report

  • Germany is the largest destination. It receives 47.0 percent of China-to-EU magnet trade; all 27 members import.
  • The sales channel is different. China buys 26.9 percent of the pork and by-product proxy's external exports.
  • Production links transmit costs. A hypothetical 10% rise in Chinese direct input prices raises modelled electronics costs 0.85% after EU linkages.

China's share has fallen to 6.3 percent in AI-compute hardware and risen to 46.6 percent in rare earths

The same measure, on one scale, for the three product families we screen. Physical-AI hardware sits between them at 12.5 percent, down from a 28.8 percent peak in 2010. Rare-earth inputs are the exception: China's share has more than doubled since 2005.

Compare the three families in the data explorer

China-origin share of U.S. imports by product family, 2005–2024, percent, one scale; dots mark sampled years

Three line charts on one scale of China's share of U.S. imports, 2005 to 2024: physical-AI hardware from 22.1% to 12.5%, AI-compute hardware from 23.1% to 6.3%, and rare-earth inputs, in sampled years, from 20.8% to 46.6%. Takeaway: China's share is falling in technology hardware and rising in rare earths.

Source: CEPII BACI HS02 (V202601); Symbiosis United Analytics analysis.

All reports

Research library

  1. AIR 005

    China–Europe Trade Conflict

    Concentrated Chinese input supply and European export exposure create different pressures. AIR 005 maps the trade, legal measures and production-cost channels that matter for sourcing and sales decisions.

    Trade policy

    PDF, 15 pages

  2. AIR 004

    Physical AI Product Network

    Where U.S. imports of robot, sensor, control and motor hardware come from, and how China-origin exposure has shifted since 2010.

    Technology supply chains

    PDF, 11 pages

  3. AIR 003 Edition 1.1,

    AI Compute Hardware Trade Exposure

    How much of America's AI-compute hardware comes from China, where the rest comes from, and how the exposure travels into U.S. production.

    Technology supply chains

    PDF, 11 pages

  4. AIR 002

    Rare Earth GVC Transition

    China's position in U.S. rare-earth and magnet imports, how far the exposure travels into U.S. production, and what a qualified non-Chinese supply could capture.

    Critical minerals

    PDF, 17 pages

  5. AIR 001

    U.S.-China Strategic Tariff Exposure Radar

    Where the 2024–2026 Section 301 tariff actions bite: 52 strategic products, their duty base, and the sourcing decisions they force.

    Trade policy

    PDF, 18 pages

An independent research institute

Symbiosis United Analytics makes global supply networks legible. We pair human judgment with machine analysis to give companies and policymakers a fact base for decisions on trade, production and investment.

Our public research is self-funded. No report is commissioned or funded by any company, government or client, and every report is free to read and cite.

Read about the institute and how we check every figure.

Where the figures come from

CEPII BACI, HS 2002 (V202601)
Bilateral trade for some 5,000 products, 2005–2024
OECD Inter-Country Input-Output tables
2023 edition, 2020 table: how imports travel through U.S. production
USTR notices in the Federal Register
Section 301 tariff lists, rates and timing, 2024–2026

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